

~~TOP SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

10 January 1949

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 117

SUBJECT: CIA Comment on J.I.G. 297/2 dated 28 December 1948

1. It is suggested that consistent use of abbreviations for BW and CW be made. Comments follow on individual items numbered in red pencil:

g. Enclosure, Page 1, Item 1. We have no information in subject document or elsewhere to indicate production in quantitative terms. The words "production preparations" are taken to mean preparations for production. If such is the case, it implies development beyond pilot plant stage. This is unsupported intelligence.

h. Appendix, Page 2, Item 2. "Probably" is an unnecessary qualification.

g. Page 3, Item 3. "Production" is unsupported, and it is recommended that it be deleted. The entire sentence then loses meaning, and it is probably best left out.

d. Page 3, Item 4. This is a congeries of military characteristics, appreciation and operational requirements. We do not believe it to be intelligence. The sentence preceding Item 4 suggests that the Russian airlift may not be adequate for application of BW agents. If this is the case, it is sufficiently important intelligence to be elaborated upon.

g. Page 3, Item 5. Meaning is not clear. Does "radii of attack" refer to flight or to area of application? In general, it is believed that discussion of capabilities for dissemination is effectively stated in the first sentence, the remainder being largely appreciation.

f. Page 4, Item 6. This appears to us to be appreciation rather than intelligence. Item 6 (a) deals with capability rather than estimated effectiveness and relates to the sentence preceding Item 4, Page 3, in which available airlift is mentioned.

Document No. 001

- 1 -

NO CHANGE in Class. ☐

☒ DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C

~~TOP SECRET~~

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-01617A000300180001-5 1763

Date: 14/11/77 By: 011

~~TOP SECRET~~

g. Page 4, Item 7. Is largely appreciation.

h. Page 7, Item 8. The Paragraph 5 referred to is not entirely applicable and is in part misleading. Suggest the following:

10. Strategic Considerations.

As in the case of BW, the moral aspect will probably play no part in any Soviet decision to use CW. Factors that will influence such decisions are (1) considerations of retaliation, (2) restrictions that might be imposed on opposing forces, and (3) the expected propaganda effect of a new weapon, favorable with respect to Soviet home consumption and adverse with respect to their enemies. Unlike the use of BW, no serious restrictions would be imposed upon Soviet forces since adequate protective and decontaminating procedures would be necessary forerunners to the use of CW.

Under favorable conditions there is likelihood that the use of CW would produce greater successes than conventional weapons and warfare. A wide choice of agents is available which offers wide latitude in the manner of use, with relatively low risk from harassing or lethal effects. Alienation of populations in nearby countries would be but a minor factor compared with the overriding consideration of military advantage obtainable from the use of CW. As in the case of BW, the most important factor governing Soviet use of CW in military operations would be the question of retaliation.

i. Page 9, Item 9. This is important intelligence and should be evaluated. Was this reliably reported or rumored, or what?

j. Page 9, Item 10. "Took tularemia experiments" is a meaningless statement. It is perhaps intended to mean that 100 subjects underwent experiments with tularemia, or were subjected to same.

k. Page 12, Item 11. It will be worthwhile to mention the award of Stalin Prize in 1947 to Professor Ivan Kuznetsov for his work in the chemistry and preparation of organic fluorides and phosphates.

l. Page 13, Item 12. The research center mentioned was not related to CW activities in any information we have seen.

2. Spellings, titles, and locations have been checked and corrected where indicated.

~~TOP SECRET~~